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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2011, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) tribunal was suspended and 
then amended by the SADC assembly after it had ruled against Zimbabwe in a case 
concerning land appropriations by the Zimbabwean government (Cowell 2013; Nathan 
2013). Many observers said that this brought in jeopardy the judicial independence of the 
court, but the large focus of the analysis has been on the member states of the SADC, 
especially the active lobbying of Zimbabwean ministers (Cowell 2013). What this example 
shows is that it is often assumed when researching judicial independence, that it is the 
contracting states that affect this.1 This is not necessarily the case. As can be seen in figure 1, 
there is only an indirect link between the contracting parties and the court, and that this link is 
mitigated through a direct link between the contracting parties and the International Judicial 
Governance Institution (injugovin) of a court. In the injugovin all contracting parties are 
represented and injugovins are linked directly to the court (Blokker 2016). These institutions 
are related to all governance functions that are executed within the court or tribunal, such as 
electing the judges or adopting the budget of the court (Blokker 2016). Examples include the 
Assembly of State Parties for the International Criminal Court or the United Nations General 
Assembly for the International Court of Justice. As these institutions have not been 
researched into great detail, this thesis will raise the question:  
Does the institutional design of international judicial governance institutions influence the 
independent functioning of international courts and tribunals, and if so, to what extent? 
                                                 
1 See for example the analyses of Cowell (2013) and Nathan (2013) on the Southern Africa Development 
Community Tribunal. 
Figure 1: General Set-up of an International Court or Tribunal 
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Current research focusses, to a large extent, only on the undue influence that 
contracting states might have on the court and making this question academically relevant as, 
it introduces a new way of looking at judicial independence (Ginsburg 2015; Posner and Yoo 
2005; Zimmermann 2014). However, the independence of courts also matters in real life. As 
can be seen from the SADC tribunal ruling or the institutional set-up of the European Court 
of Justice, international courts and tribunals have come to play a larger role in international 
politics, as many of them now have compulsory jurisdiction or can hear complaints brought 
by individuals (Posner and Yoo 2005; Voeten 2011). As a result, international courts and 
tribunals can now adjudicate all conflicts that fall within its jurisdiction, being able to directly 
influence policies of its member states (Larsson and Naurin 2016; Posner and Yoo 2005). It 
has been observed that some courts have been amended after a court or tribunal has ruled 
against one of its member states, while in other cases the court has remained unchanged 
(Blokker 2016). This means that something in the political parts of those courts need to 
differ, in order for this result to come about as it is only the political bodies of international 
courts and tribunals that can amend the court or tribunal as a whole or a specific part of it, 
making it more in line with their preferences (Ginsburg 2015; Panke 2017). 
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter two will give an overview of important 
literature. The first section of this chapter will provide a link between international courts and 
tribunals and international relations. It will show that international courts and tribunals are a 
special sort of international organizations, and that the ease of cooperation and the way these 
organizations work can differ depending on the theoretical perspective taken (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999; Cohn 2012; Rittberger et al. 2012). Institutionalism sees organizations as a 
method of facilitating cooperation, realism sees organizations as a way for the strongest state 
to remain in control and constructivism asserts that even though it is states that make the 
organization happen, it is hard to control them afterwards something the other two see as a 
necessity for the organization to remain in place (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Cohn 2012; 
Rittberger et al. 2012).  The second section of chapter two will then place this thesis in the 
debate on judicial independence and introduces two conflicting theories. On the one hand, 
separation of power theory holds that courts and tribunals are only as independent as to the 
extent that the judgement falls within the win set of preferences of those actors that can make 
changes to the court (Garoupa, Gomez-Pomar, and Grembi 2013; Larsson and Naurin 2016). 
The attitudinal model, on the other hand, holds that there are so many actors that play a role 
in changing the court at the international level that this enables judges to vote according to 
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their own preferences without regard to the preferences of those actors that can change the 
court (Kantorowicz and Garoupa 2016; Larsson and Naurin 2016). 
Chapter three will then introduce the theoretical framework and the hypotheses. 
Following to a large extent separation of power theory, this thesis will ascertain whether a 
different institutional design of injugovins influences the independence of the court. The 
hypotheses focus on how easy it is to change the statute of a court, how easy it is to withhold 
the budget of a court and the number of votes that is necessary to elect the judges of the 
court. Here, the assumption is that the easier it is to make changes or to withhold the budget 
and the lower the number of votes that is necessary to elect a judge, the more dependent the 
court will be (Garoupa et al. 2013; Ginsburg 2015; Ingadóttir 2011). The next chapter will 
introduce the research design and the methodology. This thesis will use a comparative case 
study of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in order to compare differences in the institutional design of their respective 
injugovins (Halperin and Heath 2012). The two courts will be compared on their respective 
levels of judicial independence using three variables: economic alignment, political 
alignment and voting in favour of the home state (Feld and Voigt 2003; Posner and De 
Figueiredo 2004). These indicators will be compared using a two-sample t-test for the two 
alignment variables and the Lambda test for the voting in favour of home state variable. The 
latter test is used, because the vote in favour of home state variable is a categorical variable, 
making the t-test not suitable, as you need to be able to calculate a mean of the sample for the 
t-test to yield results (Argyrous 2011).  
Chapter five contains a comparison of the injugovins of the PCIJ and the ICJ as well 
as a brief description of the two courts themselves. The PCIJ has the Assembly of the League 
of Nations and the Council of the League of Nations as its injugovins and those organs are 
responsible for setting the budget of the PCIJ, electing the judges and changing the statute if 
this is deemed necessary (Assembly of the League of Nations 1920). All decisions need to be 
taken with unanimity, except the election of the judges, for which a simple majority suffices 
(Assembly of the League of Nations 1920; The Covenant of the League of Nations 1920; 
Fachiri 1925). The ICJ has the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations 
Security Council as its injugovins. The Security Council only plays a role in electing the 
judges, with the General Assembly being responsible for setting the budget of the ICJ and 
amending the statute if deemed necessary (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). 
Important decisions need to be taken with a two-thirds majority, while for electing the judges 
a simple majority suffices (Charter of the United Nations 1945). The main difference 
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between the injugovins of both courts is therefore the number of votes necessary to get 
something done, while the main similarity is the powers given to the injugovins.  
The comparison of the injugovins of the PCIJ and the ICJ is followed by the 
operationalization of the data and the actual analysis of the data. The data is operationalized 
in order to see which court, based on the voting patterns in the two courts, is more 
independent. Based on voting in favour for the home state the ICJ seems to be more 
independent. The data on economic alignment and political alignment does not yield any 
conclusive results and the two courts seem to be equally independent based on this variable. 
The analysis will then link the differences in institutional design of the injugovins to the data 
on the independence of the court. This gives some mixed results at best. Based on the 
easiness of changing the statute the PCIJ is deemed to be more independent, while the ICJ 
seems to be more independent based on the fact that it is more difficult to withhold the 
budget (Ingadóttir 2011; Larsson and Naurin 2016; United Nations 2003). Support is found 
for neither prediction, leading to a rejection of both hypotheses. When looking at the way 
judges are elected, it is expected that the ICJ judges are slightly more independent as there is 
a larger number of actual votes necessary to get them elected and some weak support is found 
for this. The last two chapters will then point out the limitations of this thesis, possible 
avenues for future research and conclude this thesis.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter will aim to do two things. Firstly, it will place this thesis in the context of 
international relations. It will do so by showing firstly, that international courts and tribunals 
are not merely organizations that adjudicate but are often also viewed as political 
organizations. Secondly, it will place international courts and tribunals in the context of 
international organizations and the assumptions that international relations theories make 
about them. This will show that even though states try to control international organizations, 
this might be different for international courts and tribunals as states also want them to be 
independent (Posner and Yoo 2005). This leads to the second part of this chapter, which will 
place this thesis within the debate on whether or not international courts and tribunals can be 
truly independent. Borrowing from literature on national supreme courts it will introduce 
separation of power theory and the attitudinal model and pose some critical remarks on those 
two theories.  
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International Relations and International Law 
Why does this thesis fall into the realm of political science and international law and 
not just in the realm of the latter? It is mainly because of two aspects. Firstly, international 
courts and tribunals are not always seen as judicial bodies. Posner and De Figuieredo (2004) 
have shown that for example the ICJ is a highly political organization and the Southern 
African Development Cooperation Tribunal was dismantled after its member states felt that it 
was interfering in the internal affairs of one of the member states (Cowell 2013; Nathan 
2013; Posner and De Figueiredo 2004). Furthermore, several African states are currently 
debating whether or not they want to leave the International Criminal Court, as they see it as 
highly political and an institution that is only created as a new way to control Africa 
(Associated Press in Addis Ababa 2017). So even though international courts and tribunals 
are meant to adjudicate conflicts using only international law and states say they want them 
to be independent, it seems to be that international politics also play a role. 
Secondly, international courts and tribunals are not much different from ordinary 
intergovernmental organizations. In the basis, they are set up by nation states who give their 
consent to be bound and give the organization a specific task or set of tasks, which is to 
adjudicate conflicts between state parties to the court or tribunal is this case (J. Klabbers 
2013). This is for a large part in line with what institutionalism tells us about 
intergovernmental organizations. Institutionalism holds that states cooperate because they 
become interdependent because of interaction with each other (Keohane and Nye 2001; 
Rittberger et al. 2012). This interdependence creates both international law and the need for 
someone to oversee these laws, which lowers transactions costs for trade between states 
(Lipson 1984). Institutionalism holds that international organizations are the best way to do 
this, as states can make them in any way that benefits them. Furthermore, international 
organizations are controlled by the states and functions according to principal-agent theory, 
where the agent (e.g. the international organization) executes those things delegated to it by 
the principal (e.g. the member states) (Rittberger et al. 2012). In this way states can create a 
multitude of different sorts of international organizations, one of which can be an 
international court of tribunal.  
 Neo-realism on the other hand states that international cooperation is difficult to 
achieve at all, because the anarchical structure of the international system dictates a 
maximization of power which makes cooperation very difficult (Cohn 2012; Mearsheimer 
1994). The only way the cooperation in an international organization can come about is when 
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there is one state powerful enough and willing to deal with the lower relative gains in order to 
gain the absolute gains. This is an avenue often pursued by hegemonic stability theory, which 
links international organizations to the rise and fall of major hegemonic state (McKeown 
1983; Rittberger et al. 2012; Stein 1984). Here, the strongest state will have the most benefits 
from the international system, for example because the voting system favors this state. But 
something that also can happen is the rise of a new set of institutions when a new hegemon 
takes on this role, as it is also a way of the hegemon to control the system (McKeown 1983). 
The ICJ could be an example of this, as it was created during a period in time of which it was 
said that a new hegemon, the United States, was rising to power and willing to use this power 
to create a stable system2.  
 Both neo-funtionalism and neo-realism hold that, when states create an organization 
they will always remain in control over the organization. Barnett and Finnemore (1999) 
following a more constructivist argument hold that this is not necessarily true. They hold that, 
even though states make the organizations in a way that benefits them, the outcome of the 
process does not necessarily do so (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). When interacting in an 
organization, processes are being made and people with certain ideas about how to reach the 
end goal interact with each other. This can lead to a specific dynamic within the organization 
that can produce different outcomes than expected, but also make the organization less 
susceptible to orders coming from the member states of the organization that are supposed to 
set the course (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). For an international court this could for 
example mean that the court becomes more independent than was expected and rules in ways 
that was not foreseen by the members and would indicate that the court is operating 
independently from the member states, something that should not be possible according to 
the other two theories.  
 The question that therefore rises is: can international courts and tribunals be 
independent or will they always be controlled by states? Clearly this question is not only a 
judicial one, but also a political one as it is the wish of states to control the organizations as 
the theories above here state. On the other hand, states do want international courts to be 
independent as this will mean that if they are dragged before the court they know they will be 
judged based on law and not on politics (Posner and Yoo 2005). This sets this thesis at the 
crossroad of both international law and international relations. The next section will focus 
more on the question whether or not international courts and tribunals can be independent 
                                                 
2 See for a discussion whether the US was ever a true hegemon McKeown (1983) or Stein (1984) 
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and if so to what extent. It will introduce the debate between the two major theories that deal 
with this question: separation of power theory and the attitudinal model. 
 
The debate on Judicial Independence 
As the international judiciary is such a recent phenomenon, many works have 
borrowed from domestic literature on supreme or constitutional courts and applied this to the 
international judiciary (Garoupa et al2013). One of the main theories that has been borrowed 
from the domestic domain is separation of power theory (SOP). This theory holds that judges 
will take into account the preferences of those actors that can either amend the court or the 
law that the court is observing or that can provide them with jobs after their term ends 
(Garoupa et al 2013; Larsson and Naurin 2016). The vote of certain or most judges, will 
therefore be in line with those that have elected them or those actors that can change the 
whole institution of the court. SOP theory therefore holds that courts have more or less 
discretion in making their decision based on the number of actors necessary to make a change 
and the importance of the issue. This gives the most discretion to those courts that need a 
unanimous decision for anything to change and a decision that is not seen as going against 
the vital interest of important actors. (Larsson and Naurin 2016).  
SOP has been heavily criticized by proponents of a second theory, the attitudinal 
model. This theory departs from the same assumption as SOP, that judges try to come to a 
verdict that will not be overridden by the legislative, but in their view this leads to different 
outcomes (Larsson and Naurin 2016). Their criticism towards SOP lies in two aspects. 
Firstly, that SOP assumes that the actors that can perform an legislative override will be 
easily able to coordinate this and, secondly, that the court has perfect information and knows 
what the other actors’ preferences are and can act accordingly (Larsson and Naurin 2016). 
The attitudinal model holds that judges, especially those in international courts, have almost 
unlimited discretion, because it is very hard for all the actors to coordinate an legislative 
override and the court will have a lot of trouble getting the information it needs to act 
strategically and without information there is no possibility for strategic action (Larsson and 
Naurin 2016). Judges of the court will therefore take into consideration their own preferences 
and only use those preferences to come to a judgement (Kantorowicz and Garoupa 2016).  
Both of these theories are situated at the extreme end of a scale, but both theories also 
have some truth in them. This thesis will, therefore, hold that neither of these theories has full 
explanatory power when it comes to international judicial independence. Under SOP theory, 
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judges would be expected to take decisions that lie within a certain win-set and this could be 
determined by looking at the preferences of the political actors involved (Garoupa et al. 2013; 
Larsson and Naurin 2016). However, judges would need full information for this, making it 
virtually impossible for this to be a realistic outcome (Larsson and Naurin 2016). SOP theory 
is nevertheless right in assuming that courts and tribunals have a certain dependence on their 
political counterpart, as many of them need the injugovin to agree on the budget and provide 
the money (Blokker 2016). This will limit the discretion of the court to a certain extent and 
this thesis will hold that this limit differs based on the institutional design of the injugovin.  
The attitudinal model goes to the other extreme in assuming that judges have 
unlimited discretion in making their decisions, as there are too many veto powers to 
overcome the decision (Garoupa et al. 2013; Larsson and Naurin 2016). This is also not 
realistic, as otherwise the SADC would not have been able to amend its tribunal after it ruled 
against Zimbabwe (Cowell 2013; Nathan 2013). Nevertheless, there are many checks and 
balances in place that are supposed to assure the independence of the courts’ judges (Posner 
and Yoo 2005). Here, everything is done in order to make sure the judges can make their 
decisions independent of any undue influence (Larsson and Naurin 2016; Posner and Yoo 
2005; Zimmermann 2014). However, the court as an institution cannot be seen separate from 
its judges, as without the judges the entire institution would not function (Voeten 2011). This 
paper will, therefore, hold that especially the dependence of the whole institution, depends on 
the institutional design, that is all formal rules and procedures and institutional set-up, of the 
injugovin of that specific court. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
This will lead the thesis to focus on a specific part of the court, namely the injugovin. 
The injugovin becomes the most important political actor of the court, as all state parties are 
present in this organ and this is the arena that takes all decision that keep the court 
functioning, such as electing judges and adopting the budget (Blokker 2016). However, as 
figure 1 shows, there is an assumed connection between the court itself and the contracting 
states and this is the relation that is often studied. This connection is, however, only indirect 
as it is mitigated by either the treaty, which the contracting states have made and sometimes 
also can amend, or through the injugovin, in which all decisions are taken after the treaty 
comes into force (Blokker 2016; Österdahl 2011). An example of this, is the budget of the 
International Court of Justice, which is not determined by a special conference of the 
contracting states, but within its injugovin, the United Nations General Assembly.  
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In this way, the injugovin is much more powerful in exercising power over the court 
than the contracting states once the court has been formed. In this sense, this thesis will partly 
follow SOP theory, in that it assumes that the institutional design, that is all powers, rules and 
procedures, of the injugovin will influence the degree of independence that the court has 
(Garoupa et al. 2013; Larsson and Naurin 2016; White 2011). The main component of this 
are voting rules that are established within an injugovin. These voting rules determine how 
many votes each member of the injugvin has, how many votes are necessary to adopt 
something and how many votes need to be cast in order for the result to be valid (White 
2011).  For example in the International Criminal Court, important changes require a two 
thirds majority of votes within the Assembly of State Parties, while the same changes in the 
European Court of Justice require a unanimous decision and ratification of the member of the 
European Council, while in addition the European Parliament also needs to agree on the 
matter. 
 
Hypotheses 
 As said before, there are two parts that need to be looked at when assessing judicial 
independence: the independence of the court as an institution and the independence of 
individual judges. This section will discuss firstly the independence of the court as a whole, 
which has largely to do with the budget of the court, and secondly the independence of 
individual judges, which for a large part depends on how they get elected. But before turning 
to the discussion of how the injugovin can have an influence on judicial independence, it is 
important to first define what is meant by judicial independence.  
Judicial independence is most broadly defined as the absence of undue influence over 
the court by other actors (Crawford and McIntyre 2012; Kahn Zemans, n.d.; Posner and Yoo 
2005; Voeten 2011; Zimmermann 2014). This broad definition seems to be the only form of a 
definition that can gain broad support in the literature, as does the answer to the question 
whether to not judicial independence is wanted or applicable to the international level 
(Crawford and McIntyre 2012; Voeten 2011; Zimmermann 2014). As this thesis wants to 
research judicial independce at the international level, it has to assume that some form of 
judicial independence is applicable to the international level, especially since it is referred to 
in the founding treaty of many international courts and tribunals (Bertodano 2002). However, 
as this is a very broad definition, judicial independence is not something that can be 
measured directly. Furthermore, as the focus is on the relation between the judicial 
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independence of the court and the injugovin, it is important to find a way to measure 
something different than the de jure independence of the treaty. It has therefore been decided 
to focus on the de facto independence, that is whether a judge or the court as a whole can 
have an opinion that goes against the interest of the member states without being disciplined. 
 
Judicial independence of the court 
As Posner and Yoo have found in their influential article on judicial independence, 
states do value the independence of international courts and tribunals to a large extent, but 
also want these institutions to be predictable. This means that they will often try to pick those 
judges that will vote in their favour or have the same ideology (Garoupa et al. 2013; Posner 
and Yoo 2005). With the older forms of arbitration, which usually took place in the form of 
ad hoc courts, this was quite easy as these usually consisted of a judge from each party to the 
conflict and a third judge, picked by the two states together. However, this is more difficult 
for the more recent and often permanent courts and tribunals such as the PCIJ and the ICJ. 
These organizations often have larger membership, but only a limited number of judges 
meaning that not all states have their own judge on the bench the entire time. States might 
therefore look to other options to keep the courts in check. 
The most rigorous way to do this, is through amending the statute of the court. This 
would be the same as a legislative override under separation of power theory and the impact 
of this is therefore dependent on how easy it is to change the statute (Garoupa et al. 2013; 
Larsson and Naurin 2016). As states want to control the courts and tribunals but also want to 
guarantee their independence at the same time, they will not make it easy to change the 
statute but their might be differences between courts (Posner and Yoo 2005). It is of course 
easiest to change something when only a simple majority of 50% + 1 vote needs to be 
reached, while it becomes more difficult to change the statute when for example unanimity is 
required. When it becomes harder to change the statute, as with a legislative override, the 
more independent the court will be (Garoupa et al. 2013; Larsson and Naurin 2016). The first 
hypothesis of this thesis is therefore: 
H1: The easier it is for an injugovin to change the statute of a court or tribunal, the less 
independent this court or tribunal will be. 
 
Another option to control a court or tribunal is through the budget. As for all 
intergovernmental organizations, the courts and tribunals depend on their functioning on a 
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budget that is adopted or changed by their injugovin. Depending on this budget, the court can 
execute all of its functions, but a lower budget will make it harder for the court to execute all 
its functions (Ingadóttir 2011). This means that setting the budget of the court can influence 
the independent functioning of the court. 
 How is this budget adopted? Often this happens through voting in the injugovin. Here, 
each state has a certain number of votes depending on the rules and procedures of the 
injugovin, and a certain number of votes is required to get something adopted (Österdahl 
2011; Panke 2017). It follows from this that the more votes necessary to adopt the budget, the 
easier it is for states to control the court through the budget as states often do not prefer large 
budgets for institutions that do not do what states want them to do (Ginsburg 2015; Ingadóttir 
2011). The second hypothesis of this thesis will therefore be: 
H2: The easier it is for the injugovin to withhold budget from the court or tribunal, the less 
independence the court has in its decisions. 
 
Judicial independence of individual judges. 
Garoupa et al. (2013) write, in their assessement of the Spanish supreme court, on 
how individual judges become more or less independent. Besides the human desire of judges 
to keep their job, Garoupa et al. (2013) point at the number of players necessary to appoint a 
judge. As is the case in Spain, the two largest parties can usually pick the judges they want, 
without having to make compromises with other actors. This gives them loyal judges, that 
ideologically are very close to them, something that can be seen when reviewing the voting 
results in the Spanish Supreme Court (Garoupa et al.2013). This could indicate, as Garoupa et 
al. (2013) point out in their conclusion, that if parties need to compromise in order to get 
judges elected, they would elect more independent candidates as otherwise no one would be 
elected. The final hypothesis of this thesis will therefore hold: 
H3: The larger the amount of votes necessary to get a judge elected, the more independent 
this judge will be. 
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
 
This thesis will use a case comparison between the injugovin of the Permanent Court 
for International Justice (PCIJ), the Assembly and the injugovin of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to assess the influence of their 
injugovin on the judicial independence of the court (Rittberger et al. 2012). The first being a 
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predecessor to the latter, studying these cases will show whether or not the institutional 
design of the injugovin has an impact on the judicial independence of the court. Both 
injugovins have remained largely the same, as all states are party to both of them, but differ 
mainly on the institutional design, most importantly the voting rules that are applied 
(Rittberger et al. 2012). The case study can therefore assess in which respects the institutional 
design of the injugovin has changed in detail and then see if these changes have had an 
impact on the judicial independence of the court (Halperin and Heath 2012; Posner and Yoo 
2005). In order to do this, this study will rely on different sources to assess both the 
functioning of the court as the functioning of the injugovin.  
Most importantly will be the treaties of both courts and the rules and procedures of 
their injugovins in order to find out if and how the institutional design of them has changed in 
detail, as the broad changes are already mentioned (Österdahl 2011). In order to let the courts 
be as similar as possible, only cases taken up by the courts between 1923-1933 and 1945-
1955 will be taken into account in order to prevent confounding factors such as the Second 
World War and decolonization to impact the results. Lastly, literature itself will be used 
where there has been made an assessment of the judicial independence of both courts to cover 
a wide variety of angles and get an as complete picture as possible. All this together should 
be allowing for a close case comparison between the two courts and to see whether the 
institutional design of the injugovin made an impact on the judicial independence of the 
court.  
 
Methodology 
Now it is clear that the research design will be a comparative one, a method of 
comparison needs to be selected. What is going to be compared are two independent samples 
of court cases coming from two related, though separate courts (International Court of Justice 
2017). They are going to be compared on judicial independence. Judicial independence is 
going to be measured through looking at how closely the state of a judge is aligned to one of 
the states that is part of the proceedings. As this cannot be measured directly, two proxies 
will be used. Firstly, the GDP per capita will be used as a measure for economic alignment 
using data collected by The Maddison Project (2013). Previous research done into the ICJ has 
shown that economic alignment has a likelihood of predicting voting behavior in 
international courts and tribunals and that GDP per capita is a good indicator for this 
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alignment (Feld and Voigt 2003; Posner and De Figueiredo 2004). Economic alignment is 
calculated using a measure for closeness that is set out in formula one: 
 
𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐚 𝟏: 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = |ln 𝑗𝑐𝑔𝑑𝑝 − ln 𝑑𝑐𝑔𝑑𝑝| − | ln 𝑗𝑐𝑔𝑑𝑝 − ln 𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑑𝑝| 
 
In this formula, jcgdp is the GDP per capita for the home state of the judge, dcgdp is the GDP 
per capita of the defendant state and pcgdp is the GDP per capita for the applicant state 
(Posner and De Figueiredo 2004). This means that, for example, if the GDP per capita of the 
state of a judge is 5000, that of the applicant is 3000 and that of the respondent is 5500, this 
formula will give a score of -0.42, indicating that the home state of the judge is economically 
more closely aligned to the respondent than to the applicant. This will be the case for all 
negative outcomes on the closeness variable, while all positive outcomes will indicate that 
the home state of a judge is economically more closely aligned with the applicant. Then, this 
outcome is compared to the actual vote the judge has cast to assess whether or not the judge 
has voted in line with what could be expected based on economic alignment of his home 
country. This is done for the entire bench, enabling the researcher to give a predictability 
score to a certain bench, which can take a score between 0% and 100%. The mean of this is 
then calculated, which gives a predictability score for the overall sample of each of the two 
courts.  
 The second proxy that will be used is political alignment. This is measured using the 
polity IV index, which indicates the level of democracy each state has at a certain point in 
time on a scale from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic) (Center for Systemic 
Peace 2016). Political alignment has also proven to be able to influence the decision making 
of judges, based on their dependency for re-election or to get a job after they leave the court 
(Garoupa et al. 2013). Level of democracy has been proven to be a good indicator for 
political alignment, as more democratic states often favor more democratic states and vice 
versa (Feld and Voigt 2003; Posner and De Figueiredo 2004). The predictability of a bench 
based on political alignment is calculated in the same manner as for economic alignment, 
only using a different formula to calculate closeness. The calculation for closeness on 
political alignment is given in formula two: 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝟐: 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 2 = |(𝑗𝑑𝑒𝑚 − 𝑑1𝑑𝑒𝑚)| − |(𝑗𝑑𝑒𝑚 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚)| 
In this formula, jdem is the democracy score of the home state of the judge, d1dem is the 
democracy score of the respondent and pdem is the democracy score of the applicant (Posner 
and De Figueiredo 2004). As with the measure for economic alignment, a positive score 
 16 
indicates closer alignment to the applicant and a negative score indicates closer alignment to 
the respondent.  
For cases in which multiple states are on either side of the case, a slightly different 
procedure is followed, as otherwise no definitive GDP or level of democracy score could be 
awarded in these cases. This has been dealt with by using the average of these variables for 
all parties on either side of the case. In order to determine this for advisory opinions, those 
states involved favoring the majority opinion in the court were deemed the applicant and 
those states favoring another outcome were deemed the respondent. Then, were data was 
available, the average of all parties involved was used to come to a GDP per capita or 
democracy score for this group of states. Sometimes, when data was unavailable for a certain 
year, but it was clear from previous or later years that not entering a score could significantly 
alter the average, the score in the year closest to that of the judgement was used. This was 
only done for GDP, as the democracy score of a state can change more rapidly and another 
year could therefore not be used as an estimate. Using both proxies for political alignment is 
therefore necessary to get the best possible idea of dependency of the court, as for cases 
involving more than two states there is a chance that the data for either of the variables is 
different from the situation as it was. The advantage of using cases with more than two 
parties involved, is that this gives a good view as to how often, if not all the time, judges vote 
the same as the position taken by their home state. As there are more parties involved, there is 
a higher chance of multiple parties having a judge on the bench, resulting in more data points. 
 Both measures of alignment lead to an average which is measured on a scale level (a 
score between 0% and 100%) and the goal is to compare the averages of the independent 
samples. The best test to compare those means is therefore the two-sample t-test. The t-test 
compares the means of two different samples and calculates a test value (Argyrous 2011; 
Elliot and Woodward 2007). If this test value is higher than the critical value3 at a certain 
level of significance for a specific number of degrees of freedom, the means of the two 
samples are statistically different (Argyrous 2011). For this thesis, a level of significance of p 
= 0.05 will be used for a test to be significant. The t-test for the equality of two means is 
expressed in formula three: 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝟑: 𝑡 =
𝑋X − 𝑋Y
𝜎𝑋−𝑌
 
                                                 
3 The critical values for a t-test are bell shaped, which means that any negative signs for the t-value results 
in the t-test needing to be lower than the negative critical value (Argyrous 2011). 
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In this formula, ?̅? is the sample mean of either sample X or sample Y (Argyrous 2011). 𝜎?̅?−?̅? 
is expressed in formula four:  
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝟒: 𝜎𝑋−𝑌 =  √
(𝑛X − 1)𝑠X
2  +  (𝑛Y − 1)𝑠Y
2
𝑛X + 𝑛Y − 2
 √
𝑛X + 𝑛Y
𝑛X𝑛Y
 
In this formula, n is the number of cases in each sample and s is the standard deviation of the 
sample (Argyrous 2011). In order to perform a t-test it is ideal if the standard deviation of 
both samples is roughly equal and if both samples approximate normality as this makes this 
test the most robust. A slight deviation from this should not be a problem, but when the 
deviation is large, the test results might be less robust (Argyrous 2011; Elliot and Woodward 
2007).  
 For one variable, that of judges voting in favor of their home state, the t-test is not a 
good measure, as both variables are categorical and neither is at the ordinal or scale level. 
The judge either belongs to the PCIJ or the ICJ, while there are only two options on the 
favorhomestate variable: vote in favor or do not vote in favor of the home state. In order to 
assess whether there is a difference between the two courts on this variable, it is necessary to 
perform a different test. As both of the variables are nominal, the only possible test is the 
Lambda test (Argyrous 2011)A. This test uses crosstabulations, predictions and error 
reduction to calculate the strength of the relationship between two variables. In this case, a 
strong relationship will mean that that one of either courts is more independent than the other 
one, as it is possible to predict what a judge will do based on the court he is a member of 
(Argyrous 2011; Elliot and Woodward 2007). The formula of Lambda is expressed in 
formula 5: 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝟓: 𝜆 =  
𝐸1 −  𝐸2
𝐸1
 
In this formula, E1 is the amount of errors you would get basing your guessing only on the 
category (favor home state/do not favor home state) and E2 is the amount of errors you get 
when you know from which court the judge is (Argyrous 2011). The down side of using this 
test is that if the result is 0, this does not need to mean that there is no relationship (Argyrous 
2011). The assessment of the favorhomestate variable will therefore be based on both the 
crosstabulation and the Lambda test. 
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Chapter 5: Institutional Design 
 
This chapter will provide a description of the injugovins of both courts. These are the 
Assembly of the League of Nations (Assembly) and the Council of the League of Nations 
(Council) for the PCIJ and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the ICJ. This chapter will highlight the institutional 
design of all injugovins and compare the injugovins for the PCIJ and ICJ on their powers, 
rules and procedures. Before doing so, it will give a short introduction of each court, 
including its composition, relation to the injugovins and most important rules.  
 
Institutional Design of the Injugovins 
PCIJ 
The statute of the PCIJ was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 13 
December 1920 and the statute entered into force on 1 September 1921 (International Court 
of Justice 2017). The PCIJ had no formal relationship with the League of Nations Covenant, 
but the League was allowed to refer certain matters to the court (Rosenne 2006). Between 
1921 and 1931 the court consisted of eleven judges and four deputy-judges and as of the 
changes in 1931 the court consisted of fifteen judges (Rosenne 2006). During a case a total of 
eleven judges needed to be present and nine judges were necessary to take a decision. The 
judges have a nine year term and are eligible for reelection (Assembly of the League of 
Nations 1920; Fachiri 1925; Rosenne 2006). Article 31 PCIJ statute provided for the 
institution of ad hoc judges when one or both of the states to a case did not have a judge 
being of its own nationality. By virtue of article 36 PCIJ statute, the court had jurisdiction 
over all cases that the parties referred to it and all matters that were referred to it by treaties 
and convention in force. The court ceased to function in 1940 and it had dealt with 29 
contentious cases and 27 advisory opinions since 1922. The PCIJ was official dissolved in 
1946 after all judges had resigned (International Court of Justice 2017).  
The two injugovins of the PCIJ are the Assembly of the League of Nations and the 
Council of the League of nations. The Assembly was comprised of all members of all 
members of the League of Nations and every member state had one vote in this organ (The 
Covenant of the League of Nations 1920). The decisions needed to be taken by unanimous 
decision of all states present and voting, giving each member state a de facto veto power. In 
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practice, states sometimes abstained from voting when they could not fully agree with a 
resolution, to prevent a full deadlock in the League (Singer 1959). The Council, on the other 
hand, was comprised of only eight members. Four of these seats were permanently reserved 
for the representatives of the Principled Allies and Associated Powers and the representatives 
for the other seats were to be selected by the Assembly (The Covenant of the League of 
Nations 1920). Here, also, all decisions required unanimity, except those requiring the 
appointment of persons for which an absolute majority of votes sufficed (Rules of Procedure 
of the Council of the League of Nations 1920). The two injugovins shared their powers vis-à-
vis the PCIJ and had two official and one unofficial power: setting the budget, electing judges 
and changing the statute of the PCIJ.  
 The first power, setting the budget was a two-step procedure. First, the council 
deliberated on a draft budget, composed by the secretariat and a special committee for 
budgetary matters (Singer 1959). This budget was based on the previous budget and 
estimates for the next budget period, which in the case of the League of nations was a year 
(Singer 1959). The council gave itself the power to propose the draft budget to the Assembly 
and to actually let this be the budget in case the Assembly did not get around voting on the 
budget when the new year started (Singer 1959)S. Once the Council adopted the draft budget, 
it was sent to the Assembly for final approval (The Covenant of the League of Nations 1920). 
In both organs, a unanimous decision was required for the budget to be adopted, but it often 
happened that a state abstained from voting in order to prevent the League, and thus the PCIJ, 
from having any funds available over the next year (Singer 1959). For the PCIJ, the budget 
needed to cover the salaries of the judges, costs for the secretariat, costs for research and all 
other costs required to keep the PCIJ up and running (Assembly of the League of Nations 
1920). 
 The second power the two organs share is that to elect the judges of the PCIJ. For a 
judge to be elected, it was required that this person was first selected by one of the regional 
groups represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration that were members of the League 
of Nations. Of these people, the secretariat then prepared a list that was used for voting on the 
judges in both organs. During the ballot, a judge needed an absolute majority of votes in both 
organs, which would vote separately of each other (Assembly of the League of Nations 
1920). This meant, for example, that during the first election of PCIJ judges, in order to be 
elected, a judge needed 22 of the 42 votes in the Assembly and five out of eight votes in the 
Council (Fachiri 1925). Only those judge that gained an absolute majority in both organs 
were elected. Any seats that remained unfilled, would then go for a second round of voting 
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and, if necessary even more rounds could follow (Assembly of the League of Nations 1920; 
Fachiri 1925). However, if either of the organs perceived a deadlock, it could ask for a 
special committee to be elected. This committee was comprised of three members of the 
Assembly and three members of the Council that would together select one candidate to be 
recommended to both organs (Assembly of the League of Nations 1920). This could be a 
person that was already on the list prepared by the secretariat, which would require a majority 
of the committee to agree, or a person that was not on the list, in which case this person 
needed to be recommended unanimously. Following this procedure, first the positions of the 
judges were filled and then the positions of the deputy-judges were filled (Fachiri 1925).  
 The statute of the PCIJ does not provide for any guidelines or formal rules to change 
it. However, in 1929, the Assembly took it upon itself to call for a special meeting in which it 
discussed and evaluated the statute of the PCIJ (Rosenne 2006). It adopted a resolution to 
make certain amendments to the statute and in doing so decided to follow the same procedure 
as was necessary to change the Covenant of the League of Nations. The resolution initiating 
the changes needed to be adopted by unanimity and afterwards also needed ratification by all 
members of the PCIJ. The resolution calling for changes of the PCIJ was adopted in 1929, 
but it took until 1936 before all members had ratified the changes and they came into power 
(Rosenne 2006).  
 
ICJ 
The ICJ came into being at the end of World War Two as one of the principal organs 
of the United Nations. It held its first session in 1946 and the first case was submitted in 1947 
(International Court of Justice 2017). The ICJ consists of fifteen judges, a minimum of eleven 
judges need to be present during the sitting and a total of nine judges constitutes a quorum 
(Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). The judges have a term of nine years, 
with the exception of judges elected in the first election. Five of these judges had a term of 
three years and five others had a term of six years and the names of these judges were 
determined by lot (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). As with the PCIJ, the 
statute of the ICJ provides for ad hoc judges to be added to the bench when one or both 
parties to a case do not have a judge of its own nationality on the bench (Statute of the 
International Court of Justice 1945). Only states can be parties in cases before the court and 
states can either decide whether to accept the jurisdiction of the court on a case by case basis 
or to declare that they recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. This declaration can 
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be made unconditionally or conditionally (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). 
The ICJ deals with both contentious cases brought to it by states or special treaty provisions 
and with advisory opinions brought before it by the UNGA or the UNSC. The court is still in 
function and there are currently fifteen cases pending before the court (International Court of 
Justice 2017).  
The ICJ, like the PCIJ, has two injugovins: The United Nations General Assembly 
and the United Nations Security Council. The UNGA is comprised of all members of the 
United Nations and followed the principle of one state one vote (Charter of the United 
Nations 1945). Decisions on important questions are taken by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting, while all other decisions are taken by a simple majority 
decisions. Other questions can be made to require a two-thirds majority, if a majority of the 
members present and voting wishes so (Charter of the United Nations 1945). The UNSC, in 
the period between 1945 and 1955 was comprised of 11 members (United Nations 2017). The 
United States, The Republic of China, France, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are the permanent members of 
the UNSC and those members have a veto on all matters that are not procedural in nature 
(Charter of the United Nations 1945). The other six members were chosen by the UNGA, 
had a two-year term and were not eligible for immediate re-election. On all questions, each 
member of the UNSC has one vote and a requirement of 7 affirmative votes was necessary 
for any resolution to pass (Charter of the United Nations 1945). Most of the powers the 
injugovins have vis-à-vis the court are reserved for the UNGA: they have the power to set the 
budget and to approve any possible amendments to the Statute of the ICJ. The UNGA and 
UNSC share the power to elect the judges to the ICJ. 
 The budget of the ICJ is determined by the UNGA. They have full budgetary power 
and are responsible for considering and approving the budget of the UN of which the ICJ is 
an organ (Charter of the United Nations 1945; United Nations 2003). In order for the budget 
to be approved, two-thirds of the members present and voting need to cast an affirmative vote 
(Charter of the United Nations 1945). The budget is based on the budget of the previous 
budget period, which is two years, and on estimates of the following years. If there is no 
budget adopted, there will be no further activities until the UNGA grants the money to a 
certain project (United Nations 2003).  
 Changes to the Statute of the ICJ need to follow the same rules and procedures as 
those that are laid out for changes to the Charter of the UN (Statute of the International Court 
of Justice 1945). This means that any changes to the Statute of the ICJ need to be first 
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approved in the UNGA with a two-thirds majority of the members of the UNGA. Then, the 
changes need to be ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all 
permanent members of the UNSC. Any change will come into effect for every member of the 
UN, and hence the ICJ, once it has been approved by the UNGA and received the required 
number of ratifications (Charter of the United Nations 1945).  
 The judges are elected by the UNGA and the UNSC simultaneously, but in separate 
elections. The UNGA and the UNSC elect candidates of a list of nominees provided by the 
Secretary-General. The candidates are nominated by the regional groups as they are in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and only nominated candidates are eligible for a position as 
judge in the ICJ during the election (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). 
Every candidate obtaining a majority of votes in the UNGA and the UNSC will be considered 
elected and the permanent members of the UNSC will not have a veto in the matter (Charter 
of the United Nations 1945; Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). If after three 
rounds of voting there remain seats unfilled, a conference consisting of three members of the 
UNGA and three members of the UNSC will be appointed to select a name for the vacant 
seat by absolute majority vote. This conference can include a name that was not on the list of 
candidates only by unanimous vote (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). The 
name put up for election by the conference will then be put to vote in the UNGA and UNSC 
and needs an absolute majority in order to be elected in both organs. For judges elected in 
1945 this would mean, if all members were present and voting, that a candidate to be elected 
needed 25 out of 51 votes in the UNGA and 6 out of 11 votes in the UNSC (United Nations 
2011).    
  
Comparison of the Injugovins 
 The above gives a description of institutional design of the injugovins of both courts. 
Together, the courts have four injugovins, divided equally among the two courts. This section 
will provide the most important similarities and differences between these injugovins. For the 
purpose of this research, the comparison will only take place between courts and not within 
courts as it is the focus of this paper to differentiate between the institutional design of 
injugovins for each court and not the separate injugovins for each court as well. For a short 
overview, see table 1.  
 Both courts have two injugovins and they are structured in the same way. For each 
court, there is one injugovin with universal membership and one with more limited 
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membership (Charter of the United Nations 1945). While for the PCIJ the two injugovins 
work together on both setting the budget and electing the judges of the court, the UNSC is 
only involved in electing judges leaving all other powers vis-à-vis the court in the hands of 
the UNGA. Changing the statute of the court is in both cases handled by the injugovin that 
has universal membership.  
 The largest differences between the two courts seem to appear in voting rules and 
veto players. Where the rules for electing judges are exactly the same in both courts, an 
absolute majority of votes in both injugovins, are the voting rules and veto players in all other 
cases quite different (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945; Assembly of the 
League of Nations 1920). For setting the budget, or taking any other decision, unanimity is 
required in the Assembly and the Council, while in the UNGA a two-thirds majority of votes 
will suffice to set the budget. Changes in the charter require in both cases that there is a vote 
and a ratification, but for the PCIJ a change only takes effect when there is unanimity and 
ratification by all members, while for the ICJ there is a two-thirds majority vote necessary in 
the UNGA and two-thirds of the members of the UN, including the permanent members of 
the UNSC need to ratify before the changes take effect (Charter of the United Nations 1945; 
Rosenne 2006).  Lastly, the ICJ was embedded in the UN structure while the PCIJ was a 
stand-alone organization. Even though the budget was set by the League of Nations and it 
elected the judges of the PCIJ, once this was done there was no formal connection that 
remained between the two (International Court of Justice 2017). The ICJ on the other hand is 
embedded in the Charter of the UN and is formally recognized as one of the six primary 
organs. It will therefore always have to deal with the UN and have a constant link to the 
organization (Charter of the United Nations 1945; International Court of Justice 2017)h.  
 From all of the above, it seems to be that at the level of the entire court, especially 
when it comes to the budget the ICJ is the more independent court. There are more states 
necessary to be a veto player that can block the budget than in for the PCIJ, where one vote 
against the budget in either of the two injugovins can withhold the budget. For changes to the 
court, it seems that the PCIJ is likely to be the more independent court, as it is much harder to 
change the statute of the PCIJ than it is to change the statute of the ICJ, as for the former 
unanimity is required, something that is not required in the latter. Lastly, it will likely be hard 
to say anything about the independence of individual judges. In both sets of injugovins the 
judges are elected in the same manner, with the only difference that there is a necessity of 
more absolute votes in the ICJ, which could indicate that judges in this court would tend to be 
more independent than those in the PCIJ, where a lower number of absolute votes is required. 
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In order to see which court is more or less independent, the next chapter will analyze the 
voting behavior and the predictability thereof on various variables and contain the actual 
analysis.  
Table 1: Comparison of the institutional design of injugovins 
 PCIJ ICJ 
Composition Assembly: universal 
membership 
Council: selected membership 
UNGA: universal membership 
UNSC: selected membership 
Powers Budget, election, change Budget, election, change 
Voting rules (regular) Unanimity Two/thirds majority 
Voting Rules (judges) Absolute majority in both 
injugovins 
Absolute majority in both 
injugovins 
Other Separate organization Part of the UN framework 
Veto Players Budget: all members 
Election: 50% of members in 
either injugovin 
Change: all members 
Budget: one-third + 1 of the 
members of the UNGA 
Election: 50% of members in 
either injugovin 
Change:one-third + 1 of the 
members of the UN + Permanent 
members of the UNSC 
Chapter 6: Operationalization and Analysis 
This chapter will lay out the data gathered on voting behavior within both courts. It will 
provide an overview of how judges voted on contentious cases and advisory opinions that 
came before both courts and how independent this voting seems to have been. These voting 
patterns will then be compared between courts to see if any differences are observable. The 
last section will give an analysis based on the hypotheses of section two to review whether or 
not changes in the institutional design in the injugovin of a court lead to differences in the 
independence of those courts. 
 
Voting behavior of judges 
The dependence of the court is measured as how predictable the judges vote on 
certain cases. As Posner and De Figueiredo (2004) have shown, international judges do not 
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always vote completely independent from their home state. Their research focused solely on 
the ICJ and some of their variables are used to measure the predictability of courts. Three of 
their findings are used here: judges often favor their home state, richer states vote more often 
for richer states than for poorer state and vice versa and more democratic states often vote for 
more democratic states than for more autocratic states and vice versa (Posner and De 
Figueiredo 2004). This section will first give a short overview of all data used in this thesis, 
before turning to the specific findings mentioned above in turn. For each of them, it is 
calculated how predictable the whole bench, on average, seems to be and between courts it is 
calculated if this differs. 
 
Description of the data 
In the period between 1923-1933 and 1945-1955, the two courts gave judgements in 53 
cases. Of these cases 28 were contentious cases, while 25 were advisory opinions. For the 
PCIJ, which is the court under investigation between 1923 and 1933, the total number of 
cases is 30, 14 of which were contentious cases and 16 were advisory opinions. The 
remainder of the cases, 23, were handled between 1945 and 1955 by the ICJ. They gave 
judgement in 14 contentious cases and 9 advisory opinions. Were possible, for all of these 
cases are logged the judges and what they voted, who the parties involved were, whether or 
not any dissenting opinions were given, the GDP of the parties involved and the judges, the 
level of democracy of the parties and the judges and if the judge came from the same state as 
one of the parties. The codebook of all variables can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Rich vote for rich, poor vote for poor 
 The GDP per capita variable is meant to be a proxy for economic alignment. The 
Posner and De Figueiredo (2004) article has shown that both economic and political 
alignment can have an influence on how a judge votes in a certain case, with GDP per capita 
used as a proxy to measure this. For this reason, GDP per capita has also been chosen in this 
thesis. The data used in this research comes from the Madison Project, as this was the only 
source available that had any data on the period before 1950. The GDP per capita of states is 
measured in 1990 International GK$. However, even this data-set does not have all data from 
every year on every state, therefore not all cases can be used in this part of the analysis as 
some of the data is missing. When there was more than one state on the applicant or 
respondent side, which was often the case with advisory opinions but also sometimes in 
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contentious cases, an average of all data on all parties was used. In some of these instances, 
when data of one of the parties was missing but from later or earlier data it could be derived 
that this parties GDP could heavily influence the average GDP as it different substantially 
from the other party’s GDP, the data closest to the year necessary was used to get a better 
approximation of the average and the distance between the judge’s GDP and that of the 
parties involved.  
 With some of the data missing, the total number of cases used in this part of the 
analysis is 32. Of these cases, 16 were dealt with before the PCIJ and the remainder 16 were 
concluded before the ICJ. For all of the cases, a closeness score was determined for each of 
the judges using formula three. These scores are then compared to that of the vote of the 
judge, to see if the prediction based on GDP per capita corresponds with the vote the judge 
casted during the procedure. For the PCIJ this the predictability based on GDP per capita was 
42.0% (standard deviation = 24.2%) while for the ICJ this was 43.7% (standard deviation = 
15.8%). This means that, on average, in 42.0% or 43.7% of the votes, the judge voted 
something that was expected based on economic alignment with the applicant or the 
respondent (see graph 1; the lines represent the averages) 
 
Graph 1: Predictability based on GDP per Capita 
 
 In order to determine whether these means differ significantly, a two-sample t-test for the 
equality of means is used to determine this. In order to derive the test statistics, it is first 
necessary to calculate the standard error following using formula four: 
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𝜎𝑥−𝑥 =  √
(21 − 1)0.2122  +  (17 − 1)0.1682
21 +  17 − 2
 √
21 +  17
21× 17
= 0.063 
Then the t-score can be derived using formula three: 
 
𝑡 =
0.431 −  0.420
0.063
=  0.174 
With 36 degrees of freedom the t-score, to be significant at the 0.05 should be equal to or 
higher than 2.028 (Argyrous 2011). The t-score of 0.174 is lower than 2.042, meaning that 
that the test statistic is not significant at the 0.05 level. This means that there is no significant 
difference in the predictability of the vote of the judges based on economic alignment, 
indicating that both courts are equally predictable. The judges of either court, therefore, seem 
to be equally independent based on this indicator.  
 
Democracy 
 The second variable, the democracy score based on the Polity IV index, is the second 
proxy used, this time to measure political alignment. As the … article shows, this is the 
second form of alignment along which judges of the ICJ are known to vote. The data used are 
coming from the Polity IV index, with a small number of data-points coming from the 
comparable Polity II index. The Polity IV index measures different indicators for both 
autocracy and democracy and combines those in a score that gives the level of democracy for 
a state at a certain point in time. A score of 10 means that a state has achieve the highest level 
of democracy, while a score of -10 means the highest level of autocracy. Even though the 
Polity IV and Polity II indices provide a lot of data, data was still not available in all cases, 
leaving these cases out of this part of the analysis. Also, when multiple parties were part of 
the same case at the same side, their democracy scores were averaged to obtain the necessary 
data. This was only done when a score for democracy was available for a certain state at a 
certain point in time, as regime changes can happen very quickly, using data from other 
years, as was possible for the GDP per capita variable, was not possible here.  When the 
cases on which data is missing are left out, a total of 40 cases remains, 24 of which came 
before the PCIJ and the remaining 16 came before the ICJ. The closeness scores are 
calculated using formula two. These scores are then compared to the actual vote the judge has 
casted during the proceedings and any matching scores are marked. Then the predictability is 
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calculated by taking the average percentage of predictability of the judge’s vote. For the PCIJ 
this score was 54.4% (Standard deviation = 16%) and for the ICJ this score was 61.0% 
(standard deviation = 11%). This is displayed graphically in graph 2 (the lines indicate the 
average). 
 
Graph 2: predictability based on Democracy 
 
In order to determine whether these means differ significantly, a two-sample t-test for the 
equality of means is used to determine this. In order to derive the test statistics, it is first 
necessary to calculate the standard error, using formula four: 
 
𝜎𝑥−𝑥 =  √
(27 − 1)0.1602  +  (17 − 1)0.1142
27 +  17 − 2
 √
27 +  17
27 × 17
= 0.045 
 
Then the t-score can be derived using formula three: 
 
𝑡 =
0.544 −  0.610
0.045
=  −1.480 
 
With 42 degrees of freedom the t-score, to be significant at the 0.05 should be equal to or 
higher than 2.018 (Argyrous 2011). The t-score of -1.480 is lower than 2.024, meaning that 
that the test statistic is not significant at the 0.05 level. This means that based on the level of 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
Year
Predictability based on Democracy
 29 
democracy the ICJ and the PCIJ are both roughly equally independent, even though the 
means are not similar.   
 
Favoring the home state 
Of the three variables used to measure the level of independence of the court, whether or 
not a judge votes for his or her home state is the most direct one. In contentious cases, there 
are usually two of the judges on the bench that have their own state involved in the case. This 
is because often the ad hoc judge that states may add to the bench if there is no judge of their 
nationality on the bench often comes from their own state (Assembly of the League of 
Nations 1920; Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). For advisory opinions, 
usually there are no ad hoc judges on the bench, with the exception of the advisory opinions 
before the PCIJ on the interpretation of the Greco-Bulgarian agreement of 9 December 1927 
and on railway traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Permanent Court for International 
Justice 1928; Permanent Court for Interntional Justice 1931). Only cases or opinions in which 
one or more judges on the bench coincide with the parties to them will be used, as for the 
other cases there is no data that will give an indication as to whether or not judges vote for 
the state they come from. In total, there are 118 instances of which one or more judges had its 
home state taking part in the proceedings, 60 of which are from the PCIJ and 58 are from the 
ICJ.  The results lead to the following crosstabulation: 
Table 2: Crosstabulation of favoring home state 
 PCIJ ICJ Total 
Favor home state 48 29 77 
Do not favor home state 12 29 41 
Total 60 58 118 
 
The table shows that there seems to be a difference in how often judges vote for their home 
state in the respective courts. It also seems clear that the majority of judges votes in favor of 
his home state. For the PCIJ this happens in 78% of the cases and for the ICJ in 50% of the 
cases. Therefore, to calculate E1 for the Lambda formula, it is guessed that every judge would 
vote for his home state, resulting in 41 errors. When the court of which the judge is known, 
for the PCIJ 12 errors are made and for the ICJ 29 errors are made leading to a total of 41 
errors for E2. This leaves a problem, as with these data the formula for Lambda, in which E2 
is subtracted from E1 the result of this would be 0, indicating that there is no relationship 
between court and judges favoring their home state. However, from the crosstabulation it 
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becomes clear that such a relationship is to be expected. It is therefore assumed, based on the 
crosstabulation, that when looking at the voting pattern of individual judges the ICJ is most 
likely to be more independent than the PCIJ.  
 
Comparison of voting patterns. 
 This section will bring together the analysis of the institutional design of the 
injugovins of both courts and the analysis of the voting patterns from the previous section. It 
will be organized by hypothesis and for each hypothesis give what would be expected based 
on the institutional design and whether or not the data gathered on voting patterns support 
this.  
 
Changes to the statute 
 The first hypothesis stated that the more difficult it is to change the statute of a court, 
the more independent this court will be. When looking at the institutional design of 
injugovins, this would mean that the PCIJ should be the more independent court as it has the 
most difficult path to follow for the statute to be changed (Larsson and Naurin 2016). There 
is no formal way of changing the statute of the PCIJ, which means that the procedure to 
change the statute was made up along the way. It was decided to follow the same rules as 
were in place to change the Covenant of the League of Nations, meaning that unanimity was 
required to adopt the resolution to change and that this resolution needed to be ratified by all 
members of the court to become the new statute (Rosenne 2006). Even though the rules and 
procedures that need to be followed to change the statute of the ICJ are not very easy to pass, 
it should be easier than for the PCIJ as there is a requirement of only a two-thirds majority in 
the UNGA instead of unanimity and the same goes for the ratification, with the additional 
requirement that all five permanent members of the UNSC need to ratify the change (Charter 
of the United Nations 1945).  
 The data to use in this case is the data on the bench as a whole. This means that for 
this hypothesis the relation between the home state of a judge and whether or not it favors 
this home state will not be used, as this measure is specifically designed to test at the level of 
the judge, not the court as a whole. The two indicators left are the GDP per capita and the 
level of democracy.  The GDP per capita indicator does indicate that there is no clear 
difference between the two courts, with the predictability being approximately the same. The  
level of democracy indicator also does not seem to point in the direction of this hypothesis 
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being valid, with the variable indicating that neither of the courts can be said to be more 
independent based on political alignment. As there is no difference observed where there was 
expected to be a difference, this hypothesis needs to be rejected.  
 
Withholding the budget 
The second hypothesis states that when it is easier to withhold budget from the court, 
the less independent this court would be. Based on the institutional design of the injugovins, 
it is expected that the PCIJ will be less independent than the ICJ. It is easier for the 
injugovins of the PCIJ to withhold budget, as they need to adopt the budget with unanimity in 
two different organs (The Covenant of the League of Nations 1920; Singer 1959). Even 
though the council can still approve a budget for the upcoming year, it needs unanimity to do 
so and can later be overruled by the assembly. For the ICJ it gets harder to withhold the 
budget, as there is only a two-thirds majority needed to pass the budget for the next two years 
and it is only the UNGA that needs to approve this budget (Charter of the United Nations 
1945; United Nations 2003). There are therefore more states necessary to block the adoption 
of the budget, increasing the threshold to become a veto-player.  
 As with the hypothesis on the statute change, this hypothesis is again about the court 
as a whole and therefore the relation between the home state of a judge and whether or not it 
favors this home state will not be used. The results are again indicate that there is no 
difference in independence between the court. For GDP per capita, there is no discernable 
difference between the two courts. Both are approximately equally independent, which would 
indicate that the difference in institutional design does not influence the court. On the other 
hand, the democracy level indicator also has the two courts not being different on level of 
independence. This would run counter to the hypothesis, as it is expected that the easier it is 
to withhold budget, the less independent the court will be. However, with the no court being 
more independent than the other, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed and therefore needs to 
be rejected. 
 
Electing judges 
 The third hypothesis states that the more votes a judge needs to get elected, the more 
independent this judge will be. When looking at the percentage of votes that judges need, 
there would be no way of saying anything on this hypothesis. Both injugovins have the same 
rules and procedures to elect judges: they need 50% + 1 vote in either the assembly and the 
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council or in the UNGA and the UNSC (Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945; 
Assembly of the League of Nations 1920). When looking at the absolute number of votes, the 
ICJ should be slightly more independent as, at least for the Security Council, there is the need 
for at least one more vote than in the council of the League of Nations. Also, the UNGA has 
slightly more members than the Assembly of the league of nations, indicating that there, also, 
judges to be elected for the ICJ need a higher number of absolute votes than in the assembly 
(United Nations 2011).  
 For this hypothesis, the variable on judges favoring their home state will be used, as 
judges are elected on individual basis and the fact that they want to (keep) their job could 
mean they will favor their home state when it is party to a proceeding. When looking at the 
data there is a clear difference between the two, with judges that have their home state in the 
proceedings before the PCIJ being far more likely than those before the ICJ to favor their 
home state (78% vs. 50%). This seems to provide support for the hypothesis, as based on the 
institutional design of the injugovin it can be expected that this would be the case. However, 
as there is only a very small difference between the injugovins, there is a high probability 
that, even though it seems that this makes a large difference, this difference is in fact caused 
by other factors omitted in this project.   
 
Chapter 7: Limitations 
 This research project knows several limitations. The first of these, is the fact that it 
only deals with correlation and not with causality. This thesis can only say that if something 
changes in one place, something also changes in another place (Halperin and Heath 2012). 
More specifically, this thesis can only state that when it is harder to change the statute of a 
court it also seems to be the case that this court is more independent. However, this thesis 
cannot say that the larger degree of independence is caused by the different institutional 
design of the injugovin. In order to establish a possible causal link between the two, it would 
be necessary to perform an in-depth case study of courts with different injugovins and 
establish that this is in fact the only difference between them and that a difference in judicial 
independence can therefore be only caused by this difference in institutional design of the 
injugovins (Halperin and Heath 2012).  
 Secondly, this thesis only deals with two courts, which are chosen because their 
similarity makes them useful for an exploratory case study (Halperin and Heath 2012). 
However, this also means that only a limited amount of data is gathered as there are many 
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other courts and tribunals around the world today. The generalizability is therefore low, 
especially because the two courts fulfill a special purpose in this world: they are the only two 
courts that have members from all over the world and have universal jurisdiction when states 
recognize this (Elliot and Woodward 2007). As these two courts are therefore unique, it 
would be good for the generalizability of the results to be able to compare this to other courts 
around the world that have either limited membership (e.g. regional courts), limited 
jurisdiction (e.g. human rights courts), deal with another field of law (e.g. criminal law 
instead of public law) or any combination of the above. Finding similar results in different 
types of courts would increase the generalizability of the findings of this thesis, but would 
also make the findings more robust if it is proven to be applicable to more difficult cases. 
 Thirdly, the used tests also have their limits. The lambda test used for the 
favorhomestate variable let to a result of 0, while the crosstabulation clearly indicated that 
some difference was to be expected (Argyrous 2011). It is therefore difficult to establish the 
strength of the correlation, something that is mainly due to the kind of variable used; a 
categorical one. For future research it would therefore be important to find a way to either use 
a different variable or asses this variable in a different way in order to be able to determine 
the strength of the correlation. 
The t-test on the other hand is limited in the sense that for a small sample in order for 
the results to be robust normality is very important as is equality of variance (Elliot and 
Woodward 2007). While normality did not seem to be an issue, there was quite some 
difference in variance, leading to the question of robustness for the results of the t-test. This 
limits this thesis in a sense that some of the results might only be an approximation of the real 
results which could be different. This is especially the case with the GDP per capita indicator 
for economic alignment, where there was quite a large difference in variance that could have 
possibly altered the results. For future research a different method could be used to assess the 
difference between the two means in order to circumvent the problem with the different 
variance. 
Lastly, this thesis only uses a limited number of variables to establish political and 
economic alignment. Although previous research has proven that democracy scores and GDP 
per capita are a good indicator for political and economic alignment, using a multitude of 
variables would give a stronger indication (Feld and Voigt 2003; Halperin and Heath 2012; 
Posner and De Figueiredo 2004). However, during the time period under research these 
variables were the only two that could be used in both periods of time, but it only gives a 
slight indication of the two alignment variables. If future research is done in different time 
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periods or with different courts, things such as geography, membership to common 
international organizations and being and OECD country or not could also be used to make 
the two alignment variables more robust and take into account more factors that could 
influence political or economic alignment of two states.  
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has looked at the institutional design of injugovins and the impact this has on the 
independence of international courts and tribunals. Even though there has been many 
research into international courts and tribunals, this has often been done from an international 
law perspective, while it is nowadays often argued that international courts and tribunals are 
more political than law institutions (Associated Press in Addis Ababa 2017; Posner and De 
Figueiredo 2004). It is therefore important the political scientist will also look into this aspect 
more often as this can broaden and strengthen this interdisciplinary field of work. This thesis 
has tried to do so by showing that international courts and tribunals are a special form of 
international organizations, certain aspects of which can be explained by using mainstream 
international relations theories, especially in a sense that they all agree that states try to 
control every organization, something they also want to do with states even though they also 
value their independence (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Cohn 2012; Posner and Yoo 2005; 
Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck 2012). Furthermore, this thesis has worked on a new aspect of 
courts that has been often overlooked in favor of member states: the international judicial 
governance institutions (Blokker 2016). Working under the assumption that different rules 
and procedures within these injugovins can impact the independent functioning of the court, 
this thesis has set out to conduct a comparative case study of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice. As the former is the predecessor 
of the latter and the two courts have the same function in the world, they provide for a good 
case study as they have many things in common which excludes them from being able to 
explain differences (Halperin and Heath 2012). In order to compare the two courts, data has 
been collected on both the institutional design of the two courts and on the voting behavior of 
judges within the courts, which provides for the best measure of judicial independence. Three 
main variables were analyzed: the favoring of the home state of the judge in the proceedings, 
the closeness of the GDP per capita of the judge and either of the parties in the proceedings 
and the closeness of the level of democracy and the parties in the proceedings.  
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The findings were mixed at best. When looking at various aspects of the court and the 
way the injugovins can influence them, it is not all as clear cut as it might seem at a glance. 
Firstly, when looking at the way the budget is determined, the ICJ should be more 
independent than the PCIJ, but the data is unable to give any conclusive results as the means 
indicate that both courts should be equally independent. Secondly, when looking at the way 
the statute of either court is changed, the data is again unable to confirm that the prediction 
that the PCIJ is more independent might be true. Lastly, when looking at the independence of 
individual judges, it is much harder to reach any conclusion on this, as the institutional design 
of both injugovins are very similar to this respect, while the data seem to indicate a large 
difference between them.  
It is therefore difficult to determine what the influence of the institutional design of 
injugovins is on the independence of international courts and tribunals. Future research in this 
direction could work with different or more courts to help collect more data from more 
different courts and tribunals in order to see if these findings hold up in cases where 
injugovins are more different. Furthermore, future research would be able to look more 
closely to the election procedure of judges, as this is where there is a large difference between 
the two courts, but no seeming explanation when looking that the institutional design of 
injugovins. However, there is certainly merit in using injugovins in future research as they 
provide for the direct link between the states that are members of the court and the court 
itself. 
  
 36 
Chapter 9: Bibliography 
 
Argyrous, George. 2011. Statistics for Research with a Guide to SPSS. 3rd ed. London: 
SAGE. 
Assembly of the League of Nations. 1920. Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. 
Associated Press in Addis Ababa. 2017. “African Leaders Plan Mass Withdrawal from 
International Criminal Court | Law | The Guardian.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-
from-international-criminal-court. 
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations.” International Organization 53 (4): 699–732. 
doi:10.1162/002081899551048. 
Bertodano, Sylvia De. 2002. “Judicial Independence in the International Criminal Court.” 
Leiden Journal of International Law 15. Universiteit Leiden / LUMC: 409–30. 
Blokker, Niels. 2016. “The Governance of International Courts and Tribunals: Organizing 
and Guaranteeing Independence and Accountability.” In The Judicialization of 
International Law: A Mixed Blessing?, edited by Andreas Follesdal and Geir Ulfstein. 
Center for Systemic Peace. 2016. “PolityProject.” 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
Charter of the United Nations. 1945. 
Cohn, Theodore H. 2012. Global Political Economy. Pearson Press. 
Cowell, Frederick. 2013. “The Death of the Southern African Development Community 
Tribunal’s Human Rights Jurisdiction.” Human Rights Law Review 13 (1): 153–65. 
doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngt004. 
Crawford, James, and Joe McIntyre. 2012. “Chapter Twelve.” In The Culture of Judicial 
Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges, edited by Shimon 
Shetreet and Christopher F. Forsyth, 189–214. Brill. 
Elliot, Alan C., and Wayne A. Woodward. 2007. Statistical Analysis Quick Reference 
Guidebook with SPSS Examples. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
Fachiri, Alexander P. 1925. The Permanent Court of International Justice in Constitution, 
Procedure and Work. London: Oxford University Press. 
Feld, Lars P., and Stefan Voigt. 2003. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 19 (3): 497–527. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00017-X. 
Garoupa, Nuno, Fernando Gomez-Pomar, and Veronica Grembi. 2013. “Judging under 
Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the 
Spanish Constitutional Court.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29 (3): 
513–34. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr008. 
Ginsburg, Tom. 2015. “Political Constraints on International Courts.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of International Adjudication, edited by Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen Alter, 
and Yuval Shany, Online, 483–502. Oxford University Press. 
Halperin, Sandra, and Oliver Heath. 2012. Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ingadóttir, Thordis. 2011. “Financing International Institutions.” In Research Handbook on 
the Law of International Organizations, edited by Jan Klabbers and Asa Wallendahl, 
108–31. Edward Elgar. 
International Court of Justice. 2017. “History | International Court of Justice.” 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1. 
Kahn Zemans, Frances. n.d. “The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence.” 
 37 
Southern California Law Review 72: 625–55. 
Kantorowicz, Jarosław, and Nuno Garoupa. 2016. “An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional 
Review Voting in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 2003–2014.” Constitutional 
Political Economy 27 (1). Springer US: 66–92. doi:10.1007/s10602-015-9200-8. 
Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence. London: Longman. 
Klabbers, J. 2013. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Larsson, Olof, and Daniel Naurin. 2016. “Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: 
How the Risk of Override Affects the Court of Justice of the EU.” International 
Organization 70 (2): 377–408. 
Lipson, Charles. 1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” World 
Politics 37 (1): 1–23. 
McKeown, Timothy J. 1983. “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in 
Europe.” International Organization 37 (1): 73–91. doi:10.1017/S0020818300004203. 
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International 
Security 19 (3): 5–49. doi:10.2307/2539078. 
Nathan, Laurie. 2013. “The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 35 (4): 870–92. doi:10.1353/hrq.2013.0059. 
Österdahl, Inger. 2011. “International Organizaitons - Institutions and Organs.” In Research 
Handbook on the Law of International Organizations, edited by Jan Klabbers and Asa 
Wallendahl, 156–89. Edward Elgar. 
Panke, Diana. 2017. “The Institutional Design of the United Nations General Assembly: An 
Effective Equalizer?” International Relations, 1–18. doi:10.1177/0047117817690567. 
Permanent Court for International Justice. 1928. Interpretation of the Greco-Bulgarian 
agreement of 9 December. 
Permanent Court for Interntional Justice. 1931. Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and 
Poland. 
Posner, Eric A., and Miguel F P De Figueiredo. 2004. “Is the International Court of Justice 
Biased?” 234. Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics. 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics. 
Posner, Eric A., and John C. Yoo. 2005. “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals.” 
California Law Review 93 (1): 1–74. 
Rittberger, Volker, Barnhard Zangl, and Andreas Kruck. 2012. International Organization. 
2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rosenne, Shabtai. 2006. “Permanent Court of International Justice.” Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e72?rskey=V4BJpV&result=2&prd=EPIL. 
“Rules of Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations.” 1920. League of Nations 
Official Journal 1 (7): 272–74. 
Singer, J David. 1959. “The Finances of the League of Nations.” International Organization 
13 (2): 255–73. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1945. 
Stein, Arthur A. 1984. The Hegemon’s Dilemma : Great Britain, the United States, and the 
International Economic Order. Vol. 38. Universiteit Leiden / LUMC. 
“The Covenant of the League of Nations.” 1920. The League of Nations Official Journal 3: 
3–11. doi:10.1017/S000819730012851X. 
United Nations. 2003. “Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations.” 
doi:ST/SGB/2003/7. 
———. 2011. “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present | United Nations.” 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-
 38 
present/index.html. 
———. 2017. “Introductory Note | United Nations.” http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/introductory-note/index.html. 
Voeten, Erik. 2011. “International Judicial Independence.” SSRN Electronic Journal. 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1936132. 
White, Nigel D. 2011. “Decision-Making.” In Research Handbook on the Law of 
International Organizations, edited by Jan Klabbers and Asa Wallendahl, 225–50. 
Edward Elgar. 
Zimmermann, Dominik. 2014. The Independence of International Courts: The Adherence of 
the International Judiciary to a Fundamental Value of the Administration of Justice. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
 
 
  
 39 
Appendix 1: Codebook 
 
The data-set follows the set-up of the data-set used by Posner and De Figueiredo (2004) in 
their study on whether the International Court of Justice is biased. The variables caseName, 
caseNumber and Decision1 are taken from this data-set, and, if necessary, amended or added 
on to, to fit the purpose of the current study. The data can be distributed at request. 
 
This codebook will include all variables that are used for the research into the institutional 
design of injugovins and their impact on judicial independence. For each variable, the name 
of the variable in the data set is given, what this variable means in this study or the question 
asked to assess this variable and, if applicable, the meaning of the shorthand coding’s of the 
variable.  
 
caseID: Case ID 
 
A unique number assigned to each case to keep all of them apart. 
 
caseName: Case Name 
 
Name of a case as assigned by the PCIJ or the ICJ. 
 
caseNumber: Case Number 
 
Unique label for each phase of each case and each kind of case. 
C… cases are contentious cases 
A… cases are advisory opinions 
 
JudgementYear: Year of the judgement 
 
The year in which a judgement or advisory opinion was delivered.  
 
Applicant: Applicant in the case 
 
Which states/states is/are the applicant (s) in this case? 
 
In the case of an Advisory opinion: states that participated in the proceedings and share the 
eventual opinion of the court will be mentioned here 
 
Respondent: Respondent in the case 
 
Which state/states is/are the respondent(s) in this case? 
 
In the case of an Advisory opinions: states that participated in the proceedings and disagree 
with the eventual opinion of the court will be mentioned here 
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Decision1: Judge – Vote for Applicant 
 
Did a judge vote for the applicant? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
DissentingOpinion: Dissenting Opinion 
 
Did the judge file a separate Dissenting Opinion? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
JudgeAdHoc: Ad Hoc Judge 
 
Is the judge a permanent or Ad Hoc Judge? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
HomeStateJudge: Home state of the Judge 
 
Where does the Judge come from? 
 
HomeStateParty: Home state of Judge party to the trial 
 
Is one of the parties in the trial the home state of a permanent judge? 
 
0 = No  
1 = Yes 
 
d1cgdp = GDP per capita of the defendant 
 
The GDP per capita of the defendant state(s) in the year of the judgement 
 
d1dem = democracy score defendant 
 
Democracy score of the defendant state(s) according to the Polity IV index (Polity II index 
was used when information of the Polity IV index was unavailable) 
 
d1match = state of the judge matches the defendant 
 
Does the judge come from the same state as the defendant? 
0=No 
1=Yes  
 
p1gdp = GDP per capita of the applicant 
 
The GDP per capita of the applicant state(s) in the year of the judgement 
p1dem = democracy score applicant 
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Democracy score of the applicant state(s) according to the Polity IV index (Polity II index 
was used when information of the Polity IV index was unavailable) 
 
p1match = state of the judge matches the applicant 
 
Does the judge come from the same state as the applicant? 
0=No 
1=Yes  
 
jcgdp = GDP per capita of the home state of the judge 
 
The GDP per capita of the home state of the judge in the year of the judgement 
 
jdem = democracy score judge home state 
 
Democracy score of the judges’ state(s) according to the Polity IV index (Polity II index was 
used when information of the Polity IV index was unavailable) 
 
Demdistance = closeness of a judge to the parties 
 
|jdem-d1dem|-|jdem-p1dem| 
 
A negative score indicates closeness to the defendant, a positive score indicates closeness to 
the applicant.  
  
Matchdemexp = political alignment variable 
 
Does a judge vote for a state that has a similar political climate? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
matchdemexp2 = political alignment variable 
 
Same as matchdemexp, but based on dissenting opinion 
 
AVGcorrect = average of all judges that voted according to policital alignment 
 
Score between 0 and 1 that indicates the degree of independence the judges have 
  
matchCGDPexp = Economical alignment variable 
 
Does a judge vote in favor of a state that is close in economic profile? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
  
matchCGDPexp2 = Economical alignment variable 
 
Same as matchCGDPexp, but based on dissenting opinion. 
MatchVoteState = Vote of judge in favor of home state 
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Does a judge vote in favor of his home state? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes  
 
MatchVoteState2 = Vote of judge in favor of home state 
 
Does a judge vote fully in favor of his home state, based on dissenting opinion? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes  
 
 
